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Abstract 
   
Many empirical studies have inferred contagion in behavior from a correlation between 
individual behavior and the behavior of others in the same social group, rather than from any 
direct evidence.  The correlation has been variously attributed to social interaction, word of 
mouth communication, and observational learning.  As Manski (1993) famously observed, 
such correlation might be explained by peer group influence, but also, similar responses to 
common environmental changes.  More generally, correlation in behavior raises two 
questions – how information is transmitted and why individuals follow the choices of others.   
 
We address these questions in the context of subscriptions to the U.S. “do not call” registry in 
June-August 2003.  Using a rich set of data culled from multiple sources, including 
longitudinal observations of household choice, we are able to separately identify  
x Methods by which information is transmitted – social interaction and news media; 
x Reasons why households follow the choices of others – observational learning and 
telemarketing diversion, and the impact of household heterogeneity on such learning 
and diversion.   
 
Among methods of information transmission, social interaction was relatively more 
important than news media.  Among reasons for contagion, telemarketing diversion was 
relatively more important than observational learning, while the extent of learning decreased 
with social heterogeneity. 
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1. Introduction 
With very limited exceptions, U.S. federal law prohibits unsolicited telemarketing calls to 
telephone numbers on the “do not call” registry.  The U.S. Federal Trade Commission (FTC) 
opened the “do not call” registry on June 27, 2003.  Within 24 hours, over 10 million 
telephone numbers were registered.  By October 2007, more than 145 million telephone 
numbers had been registered.   
 Relative to the U.S. population of 300 million, the explosive registration rate was 
phenomenal.  It raises an important question of public policy: Should the government infer 
that the vast majority of Americans value individual privacy very highly?  If so, then, the 
government should do more to protect privacy. 
 Previous research, however, has shown that people might not engage in thoughtful 
consideration before making choices that affect their well-being.  In particular, the choices of 
other nearby individuals seem to matter – in enrolment of employees into tax-saving 
retirement plans (Duflo and Saez 2003), choice of health plans (Sorensen 2006), and receipt 
of public assistance, unemployment, and participation in public programs (Bertrand et al. 
2000; Topa 2001; Conley and Topa 2002; Aizer and Currie 2004).1 
 So, could the explosive growth of “do not call” registration merely be the outcome of 
wide discussion about the registry – one person telling another, prompting the others to 
register?  Or could it be due to learning by observing the choices of others rather than from 
direct social interaction or communication?  To address these questions, we must clarify how 
and why individual choices affect each other.   
In many empirical studies, contagion in behavior has been inferred from a positive 
statistical correlation between individual behavior and the behavior of others in the same 
social group, rather than from any direct evidence.  The correlation has been variously 
attributed to social interaction, word of mouth communication, and observational learning 
(Glaeser et al. 1996; Dekimpe et al. 1998; Bertrand et al. 2000; Kelly and Grada 2000; Topa 
2001; Talukdar et al. 2002; Topa and Conley 2002; Duflo and Saez 2003; Aizer and Currie 
2004; Sorensen 2006; Beck 2007; and Moul 2007). 
 However, dynamic marketing efforts coupled with heterogeneity in consumer 
responses to marketing effort could also generate correlation in behavior (Van den Bulte and 
Lilien 2001; Van den Bulte and Stremersch 2004).  Even if the correlation is due to 
individual learning from the choices of others, it is still instructive to understand the actual 
                                                 
1
  In the context of information privacy, Hann et al. (2007) and Hui et al. (2007) showed that people 
are willing to trade privacy protection for small monetary incentives.  
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processes – one can learn about the choices of others without any social or word of mouth 
influence.  Alone on his island, Robinson Crusoe could choose his books, music, and movies 
by the New York Times bestseller list, Billboard’s charts, and weekly box office results.   
Whether households subscribed to the “do not call” registry because they evaluated 
and considered it beneficial, because they heard from relatives and friends that it was good to 
register, because they inferred from the registration of others that “do not call” was a good 
thing, or because they read or heard about the benefits of the registry from newspapers, the 
Internet, or TV have distinct marketing and policy implications.   
If people get their information from others, then promotion and communication 
(subscribe to the “do not call” registry, have more babies, be socially responsible, buy the 
iPhone, join Second Life) should target opinion leaders, who would then spread the message 
and exert influence through their social network.  If people infer the value of the item from 
the choices of others, then these choices should be publicized (by communicating that so 
many millions of people have already registered / bought / joined).  However, if people 
exhibit correlated behavior simply because they share common personal characteristics 
(Manski 1993; Soetevent 2006), then there is no business or policy reason to target opinion 
leaders or publicize the choices of others.  Such efforts would have no effect.   
And, finally, if people get information through newspapers, TV, the Internet, or other 
mass media, then communication should focus on the benefits of the product and services 
(avoid telemarketing calls, social responsibility is better for all, Second Life is cool) and be 
placed through such media.. 
 
In this study, we investigated household subscription to the “do not call” registry.  
Using a rich data-set compiled from multiple sources, we estimated a discrete choice model 
that decomposed household utility into intrinsic preferences and social factors.  The data 
sources included the FTC, Audit Bureau of Circulation (ABC), Direct Marketing Association 
(DMA), Google News, U.S. Census, and the Social Capital Community Benchmark Survey 
(administered by the Saguaro Seminar, Harvard University).  These data allowed us to 
identify four social factors in household registration – social interaction, communication 
through mass media, observational learning, and telemarketing diversion – as well as the 
impact of economic and social heterogeneity on such learning and diversion. 
Our modeling approach and the combination of datasets, in particular, the longitudinal 
data on household registrations and the data pertaining to different social factors, allowed us 
to specifically address two questions: how information on the “do not call” registry was 
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communicated (whether through social interaction or impersonally through mass media), and 
why households followed the registrations of others (whether due to observational learning or 
telemarketing diversion).  To our knowledge, this is the first attempt to separate the effects of 
different means of communicating information, and the different motivations underlying 
contagion in observed behavior in a single empirical study. 
We found that, among methods of information transmission, social interaction was 
relatively more important than news media, while among reasons for contagion, 
telemarketing diversion was relatively more important than observational learning, and the 
extent of learning decreased with social heterogeneity.  People indeed had strong demand for 
privacy from telemarketing, and such need was more sensitive to telemarketing diversion 
than social factors. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows.  Section 2 reviews previous 
research into contagion in individual behavior.  Section 3 provides a synopsis of the “do not 
call” registry.  Section 4 introduces our research model and the various datasets and variables 
used.  Then, we present the estimation results in Section 5, and discuss robustness in Section 
6.  Finally, Section 7 concludes the paper. 
 
2. Literature Review 
Individual actions and choices have been found to be contagious in many contexts.  For 
instance, using city-level data, Glaeser et al. (1996) found high dispersion of crime rates 
across cities, which could not be well explained by individual or urban characteristics.  They 
attributed the variance of crime rates across cities broadly to social interaction, but they did 
not characterize the specific processes of interaction. 
 Similarly, using U.S. census tract data, Topa (2001) and Conley and Topa (2002) 
showed that unemployment rates were correlated among individuals in closer social networks, 
as measured by education, racial and ethnic composition variables, and neighborhood 
boundaries.  They assumed that these correlated unemployment rates arose because people 
shared information about job opportunities.  However, correlation in unemployment rates 
could also be explained by common neighborhood characteristics (e.g., localized employment 
opportunities) or impersonal communication (e.g., some local newspapers list more job 
openings than others). 
 Aizer and Currie (2004) found that the use of public prenatal and delivery services 
was correlated within groups defined by race / ethnicity and neighborhoods, but they did not 
find evidence of information sharing.  Sorensen (2006) observed that employees’ choices of 
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health plans were clustered within departments, and the department size and employees’ 
demographic distance could explain these correlated choices.  Neither study provided 
tangible evidence of social interaction, but rather, they inferred the “social interaction” from 
correlations and clustering in choices. 
The same limitation applies to studies of contagious behavior in many other contexts, 
including education (Sacerdote 2001), purchase of consumer durables (Dekimpe et al. 1998; 
Talukdar et al. 2002; Goolsbee and Klenow 2003), and choices of books and movies (Beck 
2007; Moul 2007; Santugini 2007).  In all of these studies, correlations between individual 
behavior and aggregate past behavior, or behavior of others in a close social group were 
attributed to either social interaction, word of mouth, or observational learning, without any 
explicit characterization or measures of the relevant processes.   
As Manski (1993) famously pointed out, using aggregate behavior to explain 
individual behavior is subject to the reflection problem.  Individual choices may be correlated 
because they share common personal characteristics (correlated effects), or because 
individuals respond to the exogenous characteristics of others (contextual effects), or because 
individuals are influenced by the choices of others (endogenous effects).  Any aggregate 
behavior may “reflect” all of these three effects, and using it as an explanatory variable may 
cause an upward bias in estimating the endogenous effects, i.e., contagion. 
To address the reflection problem arising from analysis of aggregate behavior, 
researchers have applied instrumental variable estimation, specific modeling assumptions, or 
carefully constructed panels or experiments (see, e.g., Duflo and Saez 2003; Sorensen 2006; 
Moul 2007; and also, the survey by Soetevent 2006).  However, to draw sharper policy 
implications, it would be best if the social factors that generated these correlated behaviors 
were directly observable.  
“Observational learning” is to learn about some uncertain information from observing 
the choices or decisions of others without knowledge about the others persons’ individual 
characteristics (Bikhchandani et al. 1991).  In the context of waiting lists for kidney 
transplants, Zhang (2006) showed that, if a kidney had been rejected by patients high on the 
waiting list, patients further down the waiting list would draw adverse inferences from the 
rejections and were then more likely to reject the kidney as well. 
An issue in the study of observational learning is to distinguish learning from pure 
information saliency, which is the pure effect of information about the item without 
information about the choices of others.  In a nicely designed field experiment at a Beijing 
restaurant, Cai et al. (2007) found that when customers were informed of the five most 
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popular dishes, demand for those items rose by 13-20%.  In contrast, just informing 
customers of the five dishes without any ranking information had no effect on demand.  
However, it is not easy to construct such controlled experiments for government programs or 
new mass-marketed products, the adoptions of which are mostly subject to a mix of social 
factors including social interaction and observational learning, and also, pure information 
saliency. 
Bertrand et al. (2000) measured social networks by the density of people in the same 
language group (what they called “contact availability”), and used it to weight the effect of 
others’ receipt of public assistance on any one person’s decision to receive public assistance.  
Their study provided rich insight into the social dynamics of welfare participation, primarily 
because they employed an exogenous piece of information – the number of other people that 
a person could speak to – as a proxy measure for inter-personal communication. 
Our research generally followed Bertrand et al.’s approach, but we used more direct 
measures of social interaction, such as how often people visit relatives, friends, and co-
workers rather than indirect measures such as language spoken.  Further, we used 
longitudinal data to reduce the potential bias caused by using contemporaneous registration 
data of others as an independent variable in the estimation.  Hence, we were able to minimize 
the reflection problem and address more precisely the questions of how information is 
communicated, and why the choices of others affect individual behavior. 
 
3. “Do Not Call” Registry 
The FTC opened the “do not call” registry on June 27, 2003.  For the first 10 days, residents 
of states west of the Mississippi (including Minnesota and Louisiana) could register through 
the Internet and a toll-free telephone number.  Residents of all other states could only register 
through the Internet.  However, from July 7 onward, everyone could register through the 
Internet and telephone (FTC 2003a). 
 The FTC stipulated that all registrations prior to September 1, 2003 (10 weeks after 
the registry was opened) would be effective from October 1, 2003, while all subsequent 
registrations would be effective only after a 90-day waiting period (FTC 2003b).  From 
January 1, 2005, the waiting period was cut to 31 days.  Listings in the “do not call” registry 
were effective for five years.2 
                                                 
2
  At the time of writing, the FTC pledged not to drop any telephone number on the registry, even after 
the five-year expiration period.  See http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2007/10/dnctestimony.shtm [Accessed 
February 20, 2008]. 
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  The registry applied to both inter-state and intra-state telemarketing calls to 
residential numbers.  Any telemarketer who called a number on the registry could be fined up 
to $11,000.  The registry did not apply to political campaigning, survey research, nonprofit 
and charitable organizations, and organizations with a recent commercial relationship with 
the consumer.   
Perhaps not surprisingly, the telemarketing industry bitterly fought the federal “do not 
call” registry in U.S. courts.3  On September 23, 2003, U.S. District Judge Lee R. West of 
Oklahoma held that the FTC had no authority to operate the “do not call” registry.  Two days 
later, U.S. District Judge Edward W. Nottingham of Colorado held that the registry violated 
the constitutional right to free speech.  The FTC suspended the “do not call” registry from 
October 1 to October 7, 2003, when the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 10th Circuit suspended 
the District Court orders.   
On February 17, 2004, the Court of Appeals overruled the District Courts and held 
that the “do not call” registry was constitutional as it “targets speech that invades the privacy 
of the home, a personal sanctuary that enjoys a unique status in our constitutional 
jurisprudence.”4  Finally, on October 4, 2004, the U.S. Supreme Court declined to hear the 
telemarketers’ appeal, which ended their legal challenge. 
 Prior to the federal “do not call” registry, 27 states had established state-level “do not 
call” registrations.  Some states charged a fee for these registrations.  Subsequently, 17 states 
merged their registries with the federal registry, while others maintained their registries in 
parallel with the federal registry (Varian et al. 2004). 
 The FTC provided us with data on all registrations, including the redacted telephone 
number with area code and exchange prefix (e.g., (617) 363-xxxx), and the date of 
registration, with the “do not call” registry between June 26, 2003 and January 6, 2006.5   
It is useful to examine the time profile of household registrations.  Figure 1(a) reports 
weekly registrations of fixed-line telephone numbers from Illinois.  Registrations rose sharply 
to peak at about 700,000 in week 2, and then diminished, but peaked again in week 10, just 
before September 1, 2003 (recall that registrations prior to that day were effective on October 
                                                 
3
  The following review of legal actions against the “do not call” registry is based on a chronology 
compiled by the Electronic Privacy Information Center (http://epic.org/privacy/telemarketing/dnc/; 
[Accessed February 20, 2008]).  
4
  “Supreme Court Upholds Do-Not-Call Registry,” Washington Post, October 5, 2004. 
5
  Varian et al. (2005) analyzed the demographics of the federal “do not call” registry at the county 
level, and found that registration was positively associated with household income and negatively 
associated with education and the presence of teenagers in the household.  Varian et al. did not 
consider the social dynamics of “do not call” registrations. 
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1, 2003, while all subsequent registrations were effective only after 90 days).  Registrations 
then tailed off until early 2005. 
[Insert Figure 1 about here] 
 Figure 1(b) reports weekly registrations from Massachusetts, which had a somewhat 
different registration profile from that of Illinois.  In Massachusetts, registrations also peaked 
at 200,000 in week 2, then diminished, but then peaked again at over 1,000,000 in week 8.  
The peak in week 8 corresponds to Massachusetts merging its state-level “do not call” list 
with the federal registry (Varian et al. 2004, Table 22).  Thereafter, the registration profile of 
Massachusetts was similar to that of Illinois.  Figure 1(c) reports weekly registrations from 
Texas, which had a similar registration profile as Illinois. 
 The above review of the chronology of the federal “do not call” registry, and the 
observed registration profiles in the various states (Figure 1), provide some useful guidance 
on sample selection.  Specifically: 
x We excluded telephone numbers which belonged to the federal or state government 
emergency, non-emergency, and directory information services.  We also excluded 
mobile telephone numbers, as it was not possible to associate mobile phone numbers 
with geographical units of analysis.6 
x We excluded registrations from any state that offered a state-level “do not call” 
registry.  State registries were more costly and less well publicized than the federal 
registry (some states charged a fee, while the federal registry is free of charge).  
Accordingly, the households that registered on state lists would probably be those 
who valued privacy more.  Further, among states, such as Massachusetts, that merged 
their lists with the federal registry, the state-registered telephone numbers were 
recorded in the federal registry in one batch, and were not separately identifiable.  
This would distort the time profile of individual household registrations.  To avoid 
measurement errors of this nature, we focused on the 28 states that did not provide 
state-level “do not call” registries.7 
                                                 
6
 A tangential issue is whether the “do not call” registry provides greater benefit to fixed-line or 
mobile numbers.  In the United States, the receiving party must pay to receive an incoming mobile 
call but not an incoming fixed-line call, so receiving telemarketing on a mobile number is more costly.  
On the other hand, the Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991 prohibits the use of auto dialers to 
call mobile numbers or leave any prerecorded message, hence telemarketers are less likely to call 
mobile as compared with fixed-line numbers (Varian et al. 2004). 
7
  We treated the District of Columbia as a “state”.  A series of Chow tests rejected the null hypothesis 
that there was no structural difference in the processes leading to “do not call” registrations between 
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x Finally, as noted above, registrations before and after September 1, 2003 had different 
effective starting dates, and the “do not call” registry was subject to legal challenge 
between late 2003 and early 2004.  To investigate the demand for the “do not call” 
registry and its relation to social interaction, without contamination by external events, 
we focused on the first nine weeks of registration. 
[Insert Figure 2 about here] 
Figure 2(a) reports the spatial autocorrelations (measured by the Moran’s I statistic) of 
weekly “do not call” registrations between all counties and telephone exchanges in New 
Jersey.8  New Jersey comprised 21 counties and 3,003 telephone exchanges, and was the 
most densely populated U.S. state.  At the telephone exchange level, the average spatial 
autocorrelation in New Jersey was 0.14 (all p < 0.01), whereas at the county level, the 
average was only 0.02, and most of the autocorrelations were insignificant.  
The spatial autocorrelation was significantly stronger among telephone exchanges 
than among counties in New Jersey (t = 10.66, p < 0.01).  Indeed, this was also the case for 
19 out of 24 states with no state-level registry.  This suggests that the contagion in “do not 
call” registrations was stronger among telephone exchanges than counties.  Typically, a 
telephone exchange is a smaller geographical unit than a county, so, this result provides 
preliminary support to direct social interaction – individuals residing in closer proximity 
would interact relatively more with each other.  This effect is likely to be weaker at the 
county level. 
By way of contrast, Figure 2(b) reports the spatial autocorrelations for New 
Hampshire, which comprised 10 counties but only 514 telephone exchanges, and was 
relatively thinly populated compared with New Jersey.  The spatial autocorrelations were 
mostly negative and insignificant in New Hampshire.  The average spatial autocorrelations at 
the county (mean = –0.05) and telephone exchange (mean = –0.06) levels were not 
                                                                                                                                                        
the counties in states with state-level “do not call” registries and those without.  Hence, it was 
reasonable to exclude the states with state-level “do not call” registries. 
8
  The Moran I statistic is a commonly used measure of spatial autocorrelation.  It is defined as 
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where n is the number of counties (telephone exchanges), xi is the number of “do not call” 
registrations from county (telephone exchange) i, and wij is the distance between counties (telephone 
exchanges) i and j, computed by the longitudes and latitudes of their centroids.  Under the null 
hypothesis of no spatial autocorrelation, the expected value of the Moran I statistic is 1/(n – 1). 
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significantly different from each other (t = 1.14, p = 0.26).  Figure 2(c) reports the spatial 
autocorrelations for Illinois, which exhibited a similar pattern as New Jersey. 
The “do not call” registry is an appropriate setting to study how and why social 
interaction affects household choice for several reasons.  The registry is maintained by FTC, 
and so provides the same benefit to all U.S. households.  FTC does not charge any fee for 
registration, and so there is no price or income effect which could generate spurious 
observation of contagious behavior (Van den Bulte and Stremersch 2004).  Also, since the 
registry is spearheaded by the federal government, any observed contagion in registration is 
not likely caused by competitive or dynamic marketing programs (unlike, for example, the 
medical innovations studied in Van den Bulte and Lilien (2001)). 
 
4. Model and Data 
“Do not call” registration is a discrete choice – each household simply decides whether to 
register its telephone number or not.  Hence, we used a random utility discrete choice model 
to study household choice, and the preferences associated with different social factors. 
 Consider any household i in county j which has not yet subscribed to the “do not call” 
registry.  Let the household’s utility in period t from the “do not call” registry be 
 ijtjtijtijtijt zxu H[DE cc ,       (1) 
where xijt is a vector of household characteristics that may affect its intrinsic preference for 
the registry, zijt is a vector of social factors (social interaction, communication through the 
mass media, observational learning, etc.), [jt captures the unobserved “quality” of the “do not 
call” registry, which is common to all households in county j at time t,9 Hijt captures 
household-specific random errors (e.g., idiosyncratic tastes toward the “do not call” registry, 
or other unobserved heterogeneity at the household level), and D and E are vectors of 
parameters that we estimated. 
 By assuming that the Hijt are independently and identically distributed with the 
extreme value distribution, and by normalizing the utility of households who did not 
subscribe to the “do not call” registry to zero, the proportion of households in county j who 
registered at time t is (McFadden 1978): 
                                                 
9
  The utility that the “do not call” registry provides to households may depend on county 
characteristics which are unobservable to the econometrician.  For example, households in counties 
where retail stores offer more sales promotions or which receive more direct-mail advertising may 
find telemarketing calls less useful, and they may get a higher utility from subscribing to the “do not 
call” registry. 
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where  
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is the mean utility (Berry 1994) obtained by households in county j at time t from subscribing 
to the “do not call” registry. 
 The proportion of households who did not register is the complement of (2), 
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Taking logarithms and subtracting (4) from (2), 
 jtjtjtjtjtjt zxpp [DEG cc   )1log()log( .    (5) 
Let Mjt be the entire pool of potential registrants and rjt denote the actual number of 
registrations in county j at time t.  Then, jtjtjt Mrp / , and (5) simplifies to 
 jtjtjtjtjtjt zxrMr [DE cc  )log()log( .     (6) 
By assuming that [jt is a county-level random variable, we could estimate (6) by linear 
statistical procedures such as ordinary or generalized least squares. 
 Since “do not call” registrations were effective for five years, households need 
register each telephone number only once in five years.  Once a number was registered, it 
would “exit” the market.  In this regard, the “do not call” registry differed from markets for 
differentiated products such as automobiles, PCs, and movies (e.g., Berry et al. 1995; Hui 
2004; Moul 2007), where repeat purchase does occur and must be accounted for.   
 Accordingly, in our model, households that have already registered would drop out 
from the pool of potential registrants, that is, the “market potential”, Mjt, declines over time,10 
and hence the market potential in each period t can simply be calculated as 
¦
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Therefore, the estimation equation (6) simplifies to 
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10
  Using data from market researcher TNS, Varian et al. (2004) calculated that, in 1999-2000, 19.7% 
of households had two or more fixed-line telephone numbers.  Such households would bias both rjt 
and Mjt upward, and so, would have little influence on the observed proportion of registrations, pjt.   
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With the initial state of each county j, Mj0, we could compute all subsequent Mjt from the 
number of registrations that we observed in the following periods.11 
 Finally, we decomposed the county-level random error into four components, 
jttjjt vdu  J[ ,       (8) 
where J is an overall state-specific constant, uj denotes time-invariant heterogeneity specific 
to county j, dt captures all time-specific demand shocks which apply equally to all counties in 
period t, and vjt captures residual errors.  In our estimation, we used a random-effects 
specification to estimate uj, and a set of time dummy variables to estimate dt.12 
 
4.1. Variables 
Many intrinsic factors could influence a household’s preference for “do not call” registration.  
For example, some households may want to register more than others because they have 
higher disposable income and so tend to receive more telemarketing calls (Varian et al. 2004), 
because their “cost” of registration (e.g., learning how to use the FTC’s website) is lower, or 
because they simply have more time to read about the registry.13 
 Accordingly, we used a set of demographic variables at the county level to estimate 
households’ intrinsic preferences for “do not call” registration, i.e., jtx  (recall from (3) and (7) 
that we specified our discrete choice model at the county level, and so we studied mean rather 
than individual household behavior).  These county-level demographics included the average 
                                                 
11
  This computation of future market potential is correct only if the number of households in county j 
is relatively stable over time, which is likely to be the case in our study because it was limited to the 
first nine weeks after the “do not call” registry was opened. 
12
  We had two reasons for using the random-effects specification.  As described below, we relied on 
the Social Capital Community Benchmark Survey of the Saguaro Seminar for measures of social 
interaction.  The Saguaro Seminar employed proportionate sampling – a variation of stratified random 
sampling – of U.S. population groups.  This would suggest using random-effects estimation since we 
are ultimately interested in making unconditional or marginal inferences with respect to the entire 
population.  The other reason was quite pragmatic – as we discuss below, several key variables, 
including the measures of social interaction, newspaper circulation, and telemarketing sales intensity, 
did not vary over time, and hence they would be “differenced out” and could not be separately 
identified in a fixed-effects specification.  Fixed-effects estimators can be very inefficient, and lead to 
unreliable point estimates, when there is little “within” variance in the studied variables (Plumper and 
Troeger 2007), which was the case in our data.  Nonetheless, we conducted some diagnostic tests of 
fixed-effects vs. random-effects in our estimation (see footnote 19). 
13
  Using a field experiment, Hann et al. (2006) showed that spam is targeted to selected customer 
segments.  Hence, households with different demographic characteristics may receive different 
amount of direct marketing solicitations.  For general analyses of the strategic interactions between 
direct marketers and consumers, see Van Zandt (2004), Anderson and de Palma (2006), and Hann et 
al. (2008). 
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number of people in a household, median household income, percentage of people who were 
economically active, percentage of people above 16 years old who were employed, 
percentage of people below 65 years old, percentage of households with a female head, 
percentage of people above 25 years old with at least high school education, percentage of 
people who were linguistically isolated, and percentage of owner-occupied households. 
 Household preferences for “do not call” registration may also depend on external, 
social factors.  Social factors can be broadly classified into “information” and “influence”.  
When I meet my colleague at the coffee machine, she might ask, “Have you heard about the 
“do not call” registry?” (information), or she might say, “everybody is signing up” 
(information and influence), or she might say, “you should sign up” (influence).  Previous 
research did not distinguish information from influence, rather simply lumping both into the 
single concept of “social interaction” (e.g., Topa 2001; Sorensen 2006).  
Within the “information” category of social factors, we considered two means of 
communication – social interaction and news media.  For social interaction, we used 
measures of the frequency of people interacting with neighbors, relatives, friends, and co-
workers, and we multiplied these variables by the lagged cumulative proportion of 
households who had already subscribed to the “do not call” registry.  These composite 
variables enabled us to estimate the effect of information arising from interaction with people 
who had already subscribed to the “do not call” registry.14 
As for communication through news media, i.e., information saliency (Cai et al. 2007), 
we used the newspaper circulation in each county and the lagged number of newspaper 
reports of the “do not call” registry, weighted by newspaper circulation.  In addition to 
capturing impersonal communication of information, these variables helped to control for the 
effect of mass marketing, which can lead to contagion-like adoption patterns (Van den Bulte 
and Lilien 2001).  We used the lagged reports to avoid capturing the effect, in the reverse 
direction, of registration on news. 
Within the “influence” category of social factors, we incorporated two forms of social 
influence in our model.  One was observational learning (Bikhchandani et al. 1991 and 1998), 
as measured by the lagged number of newspaper articles that reported the number of “do not 
call” (DNC) registrations, weighted by newspaper circulation.  To the extent that the 
                                                 
14
  Bertrand et al. (2000) followed a similar method to measure network effects, using the language 
spoken by a person as an indirect measure of social communication.  Their approach did not consider 
that people who speak the same language might vary in participation in social activities or interaction, 
which is the key variable of interest.  For empirical evidence, see Alesina and Ferrara (2000) and 
Marmaros and Sacerdote (2006). 
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coverage in local media – newspapers, radio, and TV – are correlated, the newspaper 
mentions would reflect the larger media picture as well. 
Second, strategic interaction between telemarketing vendors and consumers may 
generate a unique type of indirect social influence – the effective exposure of households to 
telemarketing may change according to the number of households that have already 
subscribed to the “do not call” registry (Hann et al. 2008).  As more households subscribe to 
the “do not call” registry, telemarketing calls might be diverted towards the remaining 
households who have not registered their numbers.  This would motivate the remaining 
households to register.  Accordingly, we used the state-level telemarketing sales intensity 
interacted with the lagged cumulative registration rate to capture this “telemarketing 
diversion” effect. 
Finally, “do not call” registration may relate to population heterogeneity – the choices 
of other people should be more informative if they exhibit similar characteristics 
(Bikhchandani et al. 1998).  Heterogeneity on various dimensions, including age, education, 
income, race, and religion have been identified as important in social integration (Alesina and 
Ferrara 2000; McPherson et al. 2001; Costa and Kahn 2003; Alesina et al. 2004; Marmaros 
and Sacerdote 2006) and new product adoption (Dekimpe et al. 1998; Talukdar et al. 2002; 
Van den Bulte and Stremersch 2004).   
We used these demographic dimensions to construct two new variables that 
characterized economic and social heterogeneity (see Section 5.2).  We further multiplied 
these two heterogeneity variables by the lagged cumulative registration rate to investigate 
how population mix and past registrations interacted to affect household decisions.  This set 
of heterogeneity-related measures allowed us to gain a deeper understanding of why people 
followed others’ actions, and they, together with the set of “information” and “influence” 
variables that we described above, comprised the jtz  vector in (7). 
 
4.2 Data 
The key to our contribution was the assembly of a rich data-set, culled from multiple 
sources.15  We aggregated the FTC data on “do not call” registrations by county and week to 
obtain the weekly registrations, rjt.  For each county j, we summed the weekly registrations 
up to week t – 1, and divided the sum by the estimated number of telephone numbers in a 
                                                 
15  
 Please refer to the Appendix for details of the data. 
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county, Mj0, to obtain lagged cumulative registration rates.16  We computed Mj0 from Federal 
Communications Commission (FCC) data on phone number utilization by area code and 
proportion of residential vis-à-vis non-residential phone lines by state (please refer to the 
Appendix for details). 
 From the U.S. Census Bureau and the Association of Religion Data Archives, we 
obtained county-level demographic data, and we used these data to calculate the 
heterogeneity-related measures (the detailed procedures are presented in Section 5.2).  To 
characterize social interaction, we needed data on household interaction with other people.  
We obtained such data from the Social Capital Community Benchmark Survey, which was 
administered by the Saguaro Seminar at Harvard University.17  Specifically, we used the 
responses to questions 51, 56D, 56F, and 56H in the survey as measures of the frequency of 
interaction with close neighbors, relatives, friends, and co-workers.  
 To capture the impacts due to different types of learning, we compiled statistics 
related to exposure to mass media.  Specifically, we obtained county-level weekly 
circulations of newspaper titles in 2003 from the Audit Bureau of Circulation (ABC).  We 
then compiled all newspaper reports of the “do not call” registry from two news archives – 
Google News and Highbeam Research – from May 2003 onward, and multiplied the numbers 
of such reports by the county-level circulation of the corresponding newspapers to measure 
households’ exposure to “do not call” reports at a county-week level.18 
 Among the various newspaper reports, we distinguished those that merely mentioned 
the “do not call” registry from those that also mentioned the number of telephone numbers 
that were already registered (e.g., “people registered more than 10 million phone numbers 
with the national do-not-call list in its first four days,” San Jose Mercury News, July 1, 2003).  
The former variable captures communication of information through an impersonal channel; 
                                                 
16
  As explained in Section 4.1, we further multiplied the lagged cumulative registration rate by 
information, influence, and heterogeneity variables to identify different social effects.  As Brock and 
Durlauf (2007) suggested, using lagged cumulative registrations can help the econometrician identify 
endogenous from contextual effects, and hence could reduce the possible bias caused by the reflection 
problem.  For a thorough analysis of the reflection problem and the identification conditions in 
discrete choice models, see Manski (1993) and Brock and Durlauf (2001, 2007). 
17
  For details of the Saguaro Seminar, see http://www.hks.harvard.edu/saguaro/ [Accessed March 17, 
2008].  We used the data from the 2000 survey because the 2006 data were not yet available. 
18
  Our weighting of newspaper reports by circulation is similar to the concept of gross ratings points 
(GRP) that is commonly used in marketing (where GRP = reach u frequency).  The measures of 
newspaper reports of the “do not call” registry and the number of people registering were lagged by 
one week to allow sufficient time for households to act (register) after reading the reports. 
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the latter variable provides information on the choices of others, and hence could lead to 
contagion indirectly (i.e., it captures indirect social influence through observational learning). 
 Finally, we compiled consumer telemarketing expenditure at the state level from the 
Direct Marketing Association.  To avoid any potential endogeneity (telemarketers may have 
adjusted their expenditure after the implementation of the “do not call” registry), we only 
used telemarketing expenditure data for 2002, and we measured telemarketing sales intensity 
as the ratio of the state-level consumer telemarketing expenditure relative to the number of 
households in a state. 
 Table 1 reports the descriptive statistics of our data, which spanned the first nine 
weeks of “do not call” registrations.  Table 2 reports their bivariate correlations.  Note that 
the Social Capital Community Benchmark Survey (from which we compiled the frequency of 
interaction with neighbors, friends, etc.) was administered to only 381 counties which were 
randomly drawn using proportionate sampling from the total of 3,141 U.S. counties.  
Accordingly, we restricted our sample to these 381 counties, leading to a balanced panel of 
3,429 county-week observations. 
[Insert Tables 1 and 2 about here] 
 
5. Results 
We first estimated a basic random-effects model that contained only state and time dummy 
variables.  In general, the coefficients of all time dummy variables were significant and 
decreasing, which is consistent with the observed pattern that “do not call” registrations 
dropped from the second to the ninth week (see Figure 1).  The Breusch and Pagan test of 
random effects indicated that the random effects specification was preferred (F2 = 4907, p < 
0.01).19  For brevity, we do not report the detailed results of this specification.  All other 
specifications included state and time dummy variables which we do not report for brevity.  
 Next, we added the mean household characteristics (the intrinsic preference variables, 
jtx ) in the estimation.  Table 3, specification (i), reports the results.  Among the household 
characteristics, only household size and median household income were significant.  Smaller 
                                                 
19
  Both the decreasing “time” effect and the significant Breusch and Pagan test results were consistent 
across all specifications.  We also performed the Hausman’s specification test for fixed vis-à-vis 
random effects, but it produced inconsistent conclusions across model specifications.  Nevertheless, in 
all fixed-effects models, the estimated correlations between the county effects, uj, and the independent 
variables were negligible, which was consistent with the key assumption of the random-effects model, 
that the estimated county heterogeneity was uncorrelated with the explanatory variables. 
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households and households with higher incomes were more likely to subscribe to the “do not 
call” registry.   
A person in a smaller household is likely to receive, on a per person basis, more 
telemarketing calls, and also, people with higher income have a higher opportunity cost of 
time, and hence bear higher costs of receiving telemarketing calls.  Therefore, it is reasonable 
that “do not call” registrations were significantly related to these two characteristics. 
[Insert Table 3 about here] 
 
5.1 How information about “do not call” was communicated. 
In the next three specifications, we examined how communication affected household “do not 
call” registration.  First, we included variables to measure the exposure of households to 
people who had already subscribed to the “do not call” registry.  In particular, we assumed 
that the impact of communication through social interaction in (7) was represented by 
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represents the lagged cumulative registration rate in county j at time t.   
In (9), the product of the social interaction measures with the lagged cumulative 
registration rate represented the likelihood of interaction with people who had already 
subscribed to the “do not call” registry.  These people could then share information about the 
“do not call” registry. 
Equation (9) also included the social interaction measures as separate explanatory 
variables.  These should be interpreted as being the complements of the products of the social 
interaction measures with the lagged cumulative registration.  They represent the impact of 
information from people who either had not yet decided whether to subscribe to the “do not 
call” registry or who had considered and decided against registering. 
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 Table 3, specification (ii), reports the results.20  The coefficients of visits to neighbors 
and relatives were negative and significant, suggesting that people who frequently visited 
neighbors and friends who either had not yet decided on “do not call” registry or decided 
against it were themselves less likely to register.  By contrast, the coefficients of visits to 
neighbors and relatives interacted with the lagged cumulative registration rate were positive 
and significant, suggesting that people who frequently visited neighbors and friends who had 
already subscribed to the “do not call” registry were themselves more likely to register.    
Overall, the eight social interaction variables made a net positive contribution to 
registrations, in the sense that the mean predicted utility (the average of the predicted values 
of the dependent variable using just the eight explanatory variables and their corresponding 
coefficients) due to these variables was positive. 
 To more precisely quantify the importance of social interaction in household utility 
from the “do not call” registry, we compared the variance of their impact against the variance 
of the impact due to the intrinsic preferences, jtx .   Following Sorensen (2006), the variance 
due to a set of explanatory variables was calculated as the variance of the predicted value of 
the dependent variable using just the particular explanatory variables and their corresponding 
coefficients.  To the extent that the variance due to the social interaction variables exceeded 
the variance due to the intrinsic preference variables, then we infer that social interaction had 
a stronger influence on household utility from the “do not call” registry.    
 We report the results of such comparative variance analyses in the last two rows of 
Table 3, where the standard deviation of social interaction is compared with the standard 
deviations of intrinsic household preferences, jtx , and idiosyncratic preferences, vjt.  Clearly, 
the social interaction variables played a stronger role than the intrinsic household preferences, 
and their effects were almost as large as those of the unobserved idiosyncratic preferences. 
 Our longitudinal registration data further allowed us to perform a counterfactual 
experiment – in many studies of social interaction, contemporaneous outcome data from 
other people in a similar social group were used as one of the key independent variables (e.g., 
Topa 2001; Conley and Topa 2002; Sorensen 2006).  This would generate observations of 
                                                 
20
  We did not include the lagged cumulative registration rate as a separate explanatory variable.  
Other than social interaction which we already incorporated in (9), and observational learning and 
telemarketing diversion which we directly identified using other variables (see Section 4.1), there was 
no good theoretical reason to expect county-level registrations to affect an individual household’s 
registration.  Including the lagged cumulative registration rate as a separate variable would distort the 
coefficients of the other explanatory variables. 
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“social interaction” which might have been due to omitted variables (see Manski 1993 and 
Bertrand et al. 2000, and, especially, the discussion of the reflection problem). 
 To illustrate this potential bias, we re-estimated specification (ii) by adding the 
current period registration rates, rjt, to the lagged cumulative registration rate in (10).  The 
result was notable.  The effects of interacting with close neighbors and relatives who had 
registered both increased substantially: for neighbors, the coefficient increased from 0.694 to 
1.102, while, for relatives, the coefficient increased from 0.027 to 0.045.  Further, the overall 
contribution of the social interaction variables in household utility was much larger: the 
standard deviation relative to the intrinsic preferences increased from 2.367 to 5.219, while 
that relative to the idiosyncratic preferences increased from 0.815 to 1.276.  Clearly, our use 
of the lagged cumulative registration rate could mitigate the potential upward bias due to the 
reflection problem (Brock and Durlauf 2007). 
 Next, we considered whether information about the “do not call” registry was 
transmitted through impersonal channels (rather than through social networks such as 
neighbors, relatives, etc), i.e., information saliency.  We included the weekly circulation of all 
newspapers in the county, and, more importantly, the lagged number of newspaper articles 
mentioning the “do not call” registry, weighted by circulation, as explanatory variables in the 
estimation.  Table 3, specification (iii), reports the results.  Both variables had positive and 
significant coefficients.  However, referring to the comparative variance, newspaper 
circulation and reports played a less important role than social interaction in household utility 
from the “do not call” registry. 
 Newspaper circulation could reflect the effects of other unobserved characteristics, 
e.g., people who read newspapers may be those who were more concerned about privacy.  
Hence, circulation may not have precisely measured the impact of mass media.  However, the 
other variable – lagged number of newspaper reports of the “do not call” registry, weighted 
by circulation – precisely captured the effect of reporting about the registry, and its 
significance implies that information in the mass media affected household decisions on 
whether to register.21 
 Finally, in specification (iv), we incorporated both the social interaction and 
newspaper exposure variables in the estimation.  In comparison with specifications (ii) and 
                                                 
21
  In another (unreported) test, we included, from the Social Capital Community Benchmark Survey, 
the amount of time that people spent in watching TV and browsing the World Wide Web (WWW), 
but these two variables were insignificant.  TV and WWW may not be focused media for information 
about the “do not call” registry, and so they are noisy measures of information transmission.
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(iii), the comparative variance analysis suggested that visits with neighbors, relatives, friends, 
and co-workers had a bigger impact than newspaper exposure.  Apparently, although people 
did learn about the “do not call” registry from newspapers (and other mass media whose 
reports were correlated with newspapers), it was social interaction that played a bigger role in 
communicating information about the “do not call” registry. 
 
5.2 Why contagion in “do not call”?  
Having analyzed how information about the “do not call” registry was transmitted, we turned 
to the issue of why individual households were affected by the registrations of others.  We 
considered two possible motivations for the observed contagion in “do not call” registrations.   
The first reason for contagion might have been observational learning – people may 
have inferred from the registrations of others that the “do not call” registry was beneficial.  
We compiled the lagged number of newspaper articles that mentioned the number of “do not 
call” registrations, weighted by the corresponding newspaper circulation, and included this as 
an explanatory variable.  Table 3, column (v), reports the results.  To control for general 
newspaper exposure effects, we also included the newspaper circulation and lagged number 
of “do not call” reports, weighted by circulation.22 
 The overall circulation of newspapers and the lagged number of newspaper articles 
mentioning the “do not call” registry, weighted by circulation, continued to contribute 
positively to household utility.  However, we did not find evidence of observational learning.  
In fact, the coefficient of the weighted, lagged number of newspaper articles mentioning the 
number of “do not call” registrations was negative and significant.  That is, once people read 
from newspapers that many people had already registered, their inclination to register 
actually decreased. 
  Such a negative effect of number of registration is surprising, but it might be 
explained by consumer expectations of improved marketing efficiency.  The “do not call” 
registry raised the operating costs of telemarketers, and so, it might have caused less-
desirable telemarketers to exit the market.  This would leave the market with a smaller pool 
                                                 
22
  Observational learning could lead to correlations between past and current behavior, which is the 
underlying assumption in some empirical research, e.g., Santugini (2007).  However, as we explained 
above, other social factors unrelated to learning could also yield such correlation.  Hence, instead of 
using past “do not call” registrations to characterize observational learning, we directly used 
newspaper reports of the number of registrations.  Since we also controlled for exposure to 
newspapers in general and reports of the “do not call” registry, this variable should precisely identify 
the effect due to information about the number of registrations.  Cai et al. (2007) used a similar 
approach to identify observational learning. 
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of more desirable telemarketers who are more attractive to consumers (Van Zandt 2004; 
Anderson and de Palma 2006).   
Similarly, people who registered for “do not call” were likely to be the ones who had 
relatively little interest in buying from telemarketing, and so, their “exit” would actually help 
telemarketers find the right customers (Hann et al. 2008).  These expectations on the supply- 
and demand-side interactions would have raised household utility from telemarketing, and 
reduced their utility from the “do not call” registry. 
Next, as we explained in Section 4.1, another motivation for households to subscribe 
to the “do not call” registry was “telemarketing diversion” – as more households registered, 
telemarketers might divert promotional calls to the remaining households.  As such, we 
specified social effects as 
jtjjt RTz DD  c ,        (11) 
where Tj was the intensity of telemarketing in county j, which was a time-invariant variable at 
the state level (telemarketing data at the county level were not available).   
 Table 3, specification (vi), reports the results of this “telemarketing diversion” effect.  
We did not include telemarketing sales intensity as a separate explanatory variable because it 
was perfectly collinear with the state dummy variables, and hence its effect was already 
accounted for in the model.  The coefficient of the interaction between telemarketing sales 
intensity and the lagged cumulative registration was positive and significant.  The 
comparative variance analysis indicated that it contributed significantly to household utility.  
In fact, its influence was several times larger than that of observational learning about 
registrations from newspapers.   
Taken together, it appears that, although the “do not call” registry might have 
benefited the telemarketing industry by more accurately matching interested buyers and 
sellers, on balance, consumers were more eager to sign up and hence avoid promotional calls 
because of the increased intensity of telemarketing. 
 Finally, we considered the extent to which household registrations were influenced by 
other households depended on the closeness of their preferences.  The degree of observational 
learning should be higher among households that are more similar (Bikhchandani et al. 1998). 
 We calculated the county-level heterogeneity on various demographic dimensions.  
Following the literature (see, e.g., Alesina and Ferrara 2000), we measured the heterogeneity 
of race, religion, and education as the probability that any two individuals drawn at random 
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from a county would not belong to the same demographic group.  Formally, the heterogeneity 
on demographic dimension q was 
 ¦

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where sqg is the share of group g in the population on factor q.  For age and income inequality, 
we used the Gini coefficient, which is a standard measure for population dispersion along a 
metric dimension (see, e.g., Van den Bulte and Stremersch 2004). 
 Our interest was to study how differences among households affected the 
informativeness of “do not call” registrations.  It was not clear which of the various measures 
of heterogeneity would be relevant to this issue.  In addition, three demographic factors – 
race, religion, and education – were categorical with probability-based heterogeneity 
measures, while two – age and income – were cardinal with deviation-based heterogeneity 
measures (Gini coefficient).  We thought it helpful to align these measures. 
Accordingly, we conducted a principal component analysis on the five demographic 
heterogeneity factors to extract their common variances, which then represented intrinsic 
differences in the population.  Table 4 reports the factor loading results.  Income, race, and 
education heterogeneity loaded on one common component, which we called “economic 
heterogeneity” to reflect their likely correlation with the economic well-being of the people.  
Religion and age heterogeneity loaded on another component, which we called “social 
heterogeneity” to reflect their close correspondence to the differences on social dimensions.  
We created two composite measures – of economic and social heterogeneity – using the 
predicted factor scores from the principal component analysis.  The descriptive statistics of 
economic and social heterogeneity are reported in Table 1. 
Using these two heterogeneity measures, we then checked the extent to which one 
household’s registration was influenced by the registration of other households depended on 
their economics and social similarity.  We specified these effects as, 
¦ c
l
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where Hl denotes either economic or social heterogeneity.  To control for any possible effects 
due to heterogeneity per se, we also included economic and social heterogeneity as separate 
explanatory variables in the estimation. 
Table 3, specification (vii), reports the results.  The coefficient of the interaction of 
social heterogeneity with the lagged cumulative registration rate was significant and negative.  
In communities that were more socially diverse, household “do not call” registration was less 
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correlated with the registration of others.  This is consistent with the theory that observational 
learning is decreasing in heterogeneity – the more socially heterogeneous is a community, the 
less useful are the actions of others as a guide to one’s own choice. 
It is useful here to contrast our results with those arising from an approach using 
heterogeneity as a proxy for social interaction under the assumption that social interaction is 
lower in more heterogeneous communities (e.g., Dekimpe et al. 1998; Talukdar et al. 2002).23  
Using this approach, our results in Table 3, specification (vii), would suggest that “social 
interaction” had only a slight impact on “do not call” registrations because, by the 
comparative variance analysis, the influence of economic and social heterogeneity in the 
utility function – 0.435 relative to intrinsic preferences and 0.249 relative to idiosyncratic 
preferences – was the lowest among all the variables that we have studied.   
By contrast, our results in Table 3, specification (ii), show that the impact of social 
interaction was more than four times larger in terms of variance relative to intrinsic 
preferences, and more than three times larger in terms of variance relative to idiosyncratic 
preferences.  Hence, studies that did not directly observe the extent of social interaction but 
inferred its significance from proxy variables such as population heterogeneity might draw 
misleading conclusions on the impact of social interaction. 
Finally, Table 3, specification (viii), included all three sets of variables (observational 
learning from newspapers, telemarketing diversion, and the impact of heterogeneity) that 
addressed the issue of why contagion occurs, i.e., why one household’s registration was 
correlated with the registrations of others.  Other than some slight differences in statistical 
significance, the estimation results were mostly consistent with those reported in 
specifications (v)-(vii).  The notable exception was that the coefficient of the interaction of 
economic heterogeneity with the lagged cumulative registration rate was positive and 
significant, which seemed to contradict our prior expectation that contagion would be 
negatively moderated by heterogeneity. 
Telemarketing diversion might explain this positive interaction effect.  As more 
households registered, more telemarketing calls would be diverted to the remaining 
households (Hann et al. 2008).  The more heterogeneous are the households in the 
community, the less well-targeted would be the telemarketing offers, and hence the less 
attractive would they be to households in the community (Van Zandt 2004; Anderson and de 
                                                 
23
 Referring to Table 2, in our data, economic heterogeneity was somewhat negatively correlated with 
three of the four measures of social interaction.  However, social heterogeneity was somewhat 
positively correlated with the four measures of social interaction. 
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Palma 2006).  Accordingly, in a more (economically) heterogeneous community, registration 
by others would create a stronger stimulus to registration by the remaining households.24 
 
5.3 The “how” and “why” of contagion  
Table 3, specification (iv), included measures of social interaction and newspaper reports, 
which generally explained how information about the “do not call” registry was 
communicated to households.  Specification (viii) included measures of observational 
learning, telemarketing diversion, and the impact of heterogeneity, which generally addressed 
why “do not call” registrations exhibited contagion.  For completeness, specification (ix) 
included all of the variables that we investigated in this study.    
Table 5 reports the comparative variance analyses results for each of these five sets of 
social factors in the combined specification (ix).  Previous empirical analyses of contagion 
variously emphasized social interaction (e.g., Bertrand et al. 2000; Aizer and Currie 2004; 
Sorensen 2006) and observational learning (e.g., Santugini 2007).  In our context, these 
factors had relatively modest influence in the utility from “do not call” registration.  By 
contrast, telemarketing diversion and the moderating effect of heterogeneity played a larger 
and more significant role in the utility function.   
The immediate implication is that, in any analysis of social factors in individual 
behavior, it is important to account for social factors specific to the context, as well as the 
generic social factors – social interaction and observational learning.  In our context, the 
specific social factor was telemarketing diversion.   
However, we caution that the relative importance of the various social factors – social 
interaction, observational learning, and context-specific factors – may vary across contexts.  
That a specific factor – telemarketing diversion – is relatively more important in the context 
                                                 
24
  Note that telemarketing diversion should also apply to the interaction of social heterogeneity with 
the lagged cumulative registration rate.  Overall, it seems that two forces were in contention – reduced 
learning owing to heterogeneity (which should decrease registration) and increased telemarketing 
diversion due to mismatched promotions (which should increase registration).  Our results show that 
the learning effect was stronger for social heterogeneity, whereas the telemarketing diversion effect 
was stronger for economic heterogeneity.  These seem reasonable ex post, because the extent of direct 
interaction between individuals often vary along social dimensions (Alesina and Ferrara 2000; 
McPherson et al. 2001; Alesina et al. 2004), and hence the learning effect may dominate in socially 
heterogeneous communities.  Economic heterogeneity, on the other hand, is more “intrinsic” and may 
not necessarily manifest in direct social interactions.  Hence, the negative impact of mismatched 
promotions may dominate for economically heterogeneous communities, causing people to register.  
Van den Bulte and Stremersch (2004) also found that income heterogeneity had a positive effect on 
contagion in new product adoptions. 
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of the “do not call” registry may have little implication for the relative importance of specific 
social factors in other settings. 
 
5.4 How much do people value privacy?  
The intricate data in this study allowed us to explore how much individuals value privacy 
from telemarketing.  By partitioning the estimated utility, we could examine whether people 
had a strong intrinsic need for privacy, and whether such need was affected by social 
interaction, observational learning and telemarketing diversion. 
 Specifically, from (7) and (8), we can “decompose” the need for privacy as follows: 
x The intrinsic need for privacy in terms of household characteristics, jtx , random 
effects, uj, and idiosyncratic preferences, vjt; 
x Changes in privacy need due to social factors, including social interaction, 
information saliency, and observational learning; 
x Changes in privacy needs due to telemarketing diversion.  As mentioned in 
Section 5.2, because the direct effect of telemarketing was “absorbed” by the state 
dummy variables, we included the state-specific constants, J, in computing these 
changes.   
Using the estimates obtained from Table 3, specification (ix), we performed various 
comparative variance analyses to quantify the relative contributions of the above sets of 
factors on household demand for privacy.  The results are reported in Table 6.  Relative to 
intrinsic need, social interaction, information saliency, and observational learning were rather 
insignificant.  Compared to the standard deviation of the intrinsic needs for privacy, the 
standard deviation of these social factors was only around 26%. 
By contrast, households were much more sensitive to telemarketing diversion.  The 
standard deviation of telemarketing diversion was around 90% of that of the intrinsic need for 
privacy.  Such a finding should not be surprising, because telephone solicitations impose 
negative externalities on consumers and directly infringe consumer privacy.  Overall, it seems 
that, in the context of telephone marketing, the demand for privacy was more a personal issue 
that was shaped by intrinsic factors and telemarketing diversion rather than social influences. 
Finally, as we stated above, the heterogeneity factors may also capture part of the 
influence due to telemarketing diversion.  Accordingly, we performed another comparative 
variance analysis by including the set of heterogeneity variables into the effects of 
telemarketing diversion.  The results are reported in the last row of Table 6.  Because the 
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heterogeneity variables may have absorbed opposite effects due to telemarketing diversion 
and learning, on balance, they had little effect on the demand for privacy. 
 
6. Robustness  
In the course of producing the estimates reported in Table 3, we made a number of decisions 
with respect to data and specification.  It was important to check the sensitivity of our results 
to differences in data and specification.   
First, we checked whether our results depended on the source of newspaper reports.  
Instead of using Google News and Highbeam, we separately compiled all newspaper reports 
of the “do not call” registry and of the number of “do not call” registrations from the Factiva 
news database.  Factiva covered 73 newspapers that were audited by ABC.  Table 7, 
specification (a), reports the results using the Factiva newspaper variables.  The coefficients 
of the newspaper mention variables had the same signs as those in Table 3, specification (ix), 
and the lagged newspaper reports of number of “do not call” registrations, weighted by 
circulation was again negative but insignificant. 
 Next, we tested the robustness with respect to the social interaction variables.  Instead 
of visits to neighbors, relatives, friends, and co-workers, in Table 7, specification (b), we used 
individual participation in formal and informal social activities, and their interactions with 
lagged cumulative registrations as measures for social interaction.25  Both interaction 
variables were close to significant (p < 0.10), but otherwise the signs and significance of all 
other variables and the overall contribution of social factors to household utility from the “do 
not call” registry were similar to those in Table 3. 
 In Table 3, specifications (v), (viii) and (ix), lagged newspaper reports of the number 
of “do not call” registrations had negative coefficients and mixed significance.  Could this 
result be due a measurement error?  Newspaper reports may have had an immediate effect on 
household registration.  By lagging the newspaper measures, the estimated impact on 
household utility might have been weakened. 
 To test this, we used contemporaneous newspaper variables in place of the lagged 
ones.  The results are reported in Table 7, specification (c), and they are consistent with those 
in Table 3.  Newspaper reports of the number of “do not call” registrations, weighted by 
                                                 
25
  We obtained such data from the Social Capital Community Benchmark Survey.  According to the 
Survey, formal social interaction was defined as the extent of formal group involvements such as 
attending public meetings and club meetings; informal social interaction was defined as having 
friends visit home, visiting with relatives, socializing with co-workers outside of work, hanging out 
with friends in public places, and playing cards and board games. 
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circulation, continued to be negative and significant.  The coefficients of the two newspaper 
mention variables were somewhat bigger than those reported in Table 3.  However, the 
comparative variance analysis suggests that the contribution of these contemporaneous 
measures to household utility was marginally smaller than that of the lagged newspaper 
mention variables.26 
 The limitation of Google News, Highbeam, and Factiva is that they covered only 
relatively well-circulated newspaper titles.  Accordingly, our measures of newspaper reports 
may have under-stated the impact of mass media in counties dominated by less well-
circulated newspaper titles.  The latter are probably the more rural counties.  To account for 
this, in Table 7, specification (d), we re-estimated the full specification, excluding those 
counties that had below median population density. 
 Most of the social factors had similar signs and significance, albeit their magnitudes 
differed considerably from those in the earlier specifications because of the trimming of less 
densely populated counties.  More importantly, the lagged newspaper reports of number of 
“do not call” registrations, weighted by circulation, continued to have a negative but 
insignificant coefficient.  Hence, our results were robust to sample classification based on 
population density (which more generally reflects county urbanization). 
 Finally, our dataset included a panel of 381 counties.  Household choices in these 
counties might vary systematically according to local factors which had not been well 
captured in the demographic variables and random effects that we incorporated in the 
estimation.  It is possible that the model errors were serially correlated.  In the next test, we 
re-estimated the full model by incorporating an AR(1) error structure.  The results are 
reported in Table 7, specification (e).  Most of the coefficients had the same signs and similar 
magnitude, but the model was generally less significant.  The relative contribution of the set 
of social factors to household utility was also lower compared with the other specifications in 
Tables 3 and 7. 
 
7. Concluding Remarks 
Correlation in individual behavior raises two questions – how information is transmitted and 
why individuals follow the choices of others.  We addressed these questions in the context of 
                                                 
26
  We also tried lagging the newspaper mention variables by one more week (i.e., a lag of two weeks 
rather than one).  The signs of the coefficients of the two newspaper mention variables remained the 
same, but their magnitudes were much smaller as compared with those in Table 3, specification (ix).  
Together with Table 7, specification (c), this provides strong evidence that the effect of newspaper 
mentions diminished over time. 
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the U.S. “do not call” registry, using a rich set of data culled from multiple sources, including 
longitudinal observations of registration decisions.   
 Among methods of information transmission, we found that social interaction is 
relatively more important than news media.  Among reasons for contagion, we found that 
telemarketing diversion is much more important than observational learning, while the extent 
of learning decreases with social heterogeneity. 
We also found that individuals value privacy from telemarketing, and their demand 
for such privacy was strongly influenced by telemarketing diversion, which imposes negative 
externalities.  By contrast, social interaction, information salience, and observational learning 
played a relatively minor role in the demand for privacy.   
Our results suggest that, in any analysis of social factors in individual behavior, it is 
important to account for social factors specific to the context, as well as the generic social 
factors – social interaction and observational learning.  However, the relative importance of 
the various social factors – social interaction, observational learning, and factors specific to 
the context – may vary across contexts.  For example, it is intuitive that the effects of social 
interaction and observational learning would be stronger for products such as the iPhone, 
Wikipedia, and movies, and welfare programs. 
Previous research did not distinguish between the two effects of social interaction – 
information and influence.  Any discussion of “do not call” with friends or co-workers would 
surely provide information – the benefits of avoiding telemarketing, how to register, etc.  So, 
social interaction certainly communicates information.   
Social interaction might also extend to influence – “you should register … it’s so 
easy”, “everyone’s registering”, etc.  In other contexts, such as crime, education, and fashion, 
social interaction might even extend to peer pressure – “you’re not cool if you don’t” (see, 
e.g., Case and Katz 1991).   
To account for social interaction, we used measures from the Social Capital 
Community Benchmark Survey, administered by the Saguaro Seminar.  As seemed 
appropriate, we used these to measure the information conveyed by social interaction.  
However, we had no way to separately identify the influence effected by social interaction.  
To this extent, our measures of social interaction provided an upper bound to the impact of 
social communication of information. 
Indeed, any natural experiment is very likely to suffer from the same difficulty of 
identifying influence in social interaction.  If individuals with similar characteristics interact 
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and behave similarly, that would be evidence of social communication of information and, in 
addition, it could be evidence of peer influence too (Duflo and Saez 2003). 
Realistically, it seems difficult to identify the “influence” effect except through a very 
carefully controlled experiment in which the subjects follow well-defined scripts.  All 
subjects would share information about the item, but only randomly selected participants 
would exert influence.  An alternative is to select a natural setting in which people are already 
well informed about the item under consideration.  Then, any social interaction would likely 
capture “influence” rather than “information” effect. 
The results in Tables 3 and 7 show that most household characteristics were not good 
predictors of “do not call” registrations, and the idiosyncratic preferences, vjt, contributed 
most to household utility from the registry.  Future research should identify more relevant 
variables that could explain households’ needs for privacy.  
Finally, our research characterized observational learning through newspaper reports.  
This seemed appropriate in the context of “do not call” registration because the government 
disseminated information on “do not call” mostly through press releases (see, e.g., the FTC’s 
website).  However, in other settings, observational learning may occur through different 
channels and media (Zhang 2006; Cai et al. 2007; Santugini 2007).  Future research should 
evaluate the extent to which newspapers, or, more generally, mass media reports contribute to 
observational learning. 
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Table 1. Descriptive Statistics 
 Variable Source Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
1 Weekly registration FTC 2,901.97 9,762.88 2.00 239,772.00 
2 Initial market potential (Mj0; in thousands)
a calculated 204.70 477.11 1.70 5,749.47 
3 
Lagged cumulative registrations (as a 
proportion of total market potential) 
calculated 0.09 0.06 0 0.39 
4 Average number of people in a household Census 2.64 0.20 2.07 3.69 
5 Median household income (in thousand $) Census 40.95 10.13 21.52 81.05 
6 
Percentage of people who were 
economically active 
Census 0.77 0.02 0.70 0.84 
7 
Percentage of people above 16 years old 
who were employed 
Census 0.97 0.01 0.91 0.99 
8 Percentage of people below 65 years old Census 0.87 0.03 0.74 1.00 
9 Percentage of households with female head Census 0.11 0.04 0.04 0.28 
10 
Percentage of people above 25 years old 
who received at least high school education 
Census 0.81 0.07 0.52 0.94 
11 
Percentage of people who were linguistically 
isolated 
Census 0.02 0.02 0 0.17 
12 
Percentage of households who owned the 
housing units in which they lived 
Census 0.72 0.09 0.31 0.88 
13 Frequency of visiting immediate neighborsb Saguaro 5.17 1.21 1.00 7.00 
14 Frequency of visiting relativesb Saguaro 27.87 16.76 0 60.00 
15 Frequency of having friends visitingb Saguaro 22.20 15.60 0 60.00 
16 
Frequency of socializing with co-workers 
outside workb 
Saguaro 14.09 14.39 0 60.00 
17 
Weekly newspaper circulation (in 
thousands) 
ABC 0.31 0.11 0.02 0.67 
18 
Newspaper reports of DNC (weighted by 
weekly circulation; in thousands)c 
Google 0.58 1.46 0 17.01 
19 
Newspaper reports of number of DNC 
registrations (weighted by weekly 
circulation; in thousands)c 
Google 0.13 0.50 0 10.93 
20 
Telemarketing sales intensity (in thousand 
US$)d  
DMA 1.70 0.23 1.30 3.34 
21 Economic heterogeneitye calculated 0.24 0.92 -2.31 2.50 
22 Social heterogeneitye calculated 0.14 0.84 -3.47 2.44 
a  Please refer to Appendix for formula.  
b  From the Social Capital Community Benchmark Survey – see 
http://www.hks.harvard.edu/saguaro/communitysurvey/index.html. 
c  For each county, we multiplied the number of newspaper articles that reported the “do not call”  registry (or 
the number of telephone numbers on the registry) by the corresponding weekly circulation. 
d  Computed by dividing the 2002 state-level telemarketing expenditure (in thousand US$) by the total number 
of households in the state. 
e  We computed economic heterogeneity by using the factor scores obtained from a principal-component 
analysis of income, race, and education heterogeneity.  We computed social heterogeneity by using the factor 
scores obtained from a principal-component analysis of religion and age heterogeneity. 
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Table 3. Random-effects estimation 
 (i) (ii) (iii) (iv) 
Frequency of visiting immediate neighbors  
-0.047*** 
(0.011) 
 
-0.049*** 
(0.011) 
Frequency of visiting relatives  
-0.003*** 
(0.001) 
 
-0.003*** 
(0.001) 
Frequency of having friends visiting  
0.002 
(0.001) 
 
0.002 
(0.001) 
Frequency of socializing with co-workers 
outside work 
 
-0.001 
(0.001) 
 
-0.001 
(0.001) 
Freq. of visiting immediate neighbors × 
lagged cumulative registration rate 
 
0.694*** 
(0.060) 
 
0.669*** 
(0.060) 
Freq. of visiting relatives ×  
lagged cumulative registration rate 
 
0.027*** 
(0.008) 
 
0.026*** 
(0.008) 
Freq. of having friends visiting ×  
lagged cumulative registration rate 
 
-0.007 
(0.009) 
 
-0.009 
(0.009) 
Freq. of socializing with co-workers ×  
lagged cumulative registration rate 
 
0.003 
(0.009) 
 
0.003 
(0.009) 
Weekly newspaper circulation    
0.796*** 
(0.213) 
0.537*** 
(0.112) 
Lagged newspaper reports of DNC, weighted 
by circulation  
  
0.010** 
(0.005) 
0.012** 
(0.005) 
Lagged newspaper reports of number of 
DNC registrations, weighted by circulation  
    
Telemarketing sales intensity ×  
lagged cumulative registration rate 
    
Economic heterogeneity   
 
 
 
Social heterogeneity   
 
 
 
Economic heterogeneity ×  
lagged cumulative registration rate 
    
Social heterogeneity ×  
lagged cumulative registration rate 
    
Average number of people in a household 
-0.426** 
(0.215) 
-0.275** 
(0.107) 
-0.444** 
(0.211) 
-0.290*** 
(0.106) 
Median household income 
0.011** 
(0.006) 
0.008*** 
(0.003) 
0.006 
(0.006) 
0.004 
(0.003) 
Percentage of people who were economically 
active 
0.088 
(1.930) 
-0.273 
(0.950) 
0.225 
(1.901) 
-0.096 
(0.948) 
Percentage of people above 16 years old who 
were employed 
-1.689 
(3.215) 
-1.187 
(1.621) 
-1.680 
(3.161) 
-1.089 
(1.612) 
Percentage of people below 65 years old 
0.011 
(1.376) 
-0.060 
(0.672) 
0.756 
(1.365) 
0.461 
(0.676) 
Percentage of households led by female 
0.407 
(0.996) 
0.160 
(0.509) 
0.116 
(0.981) 
-0.025 
(0.505) 
Percentage of people above 25 years old who 
received at least high school education 
0.654 
(0.778) 
0.125 
(0.378) 
0.546 
(0.767) 
0.100 
(0.377) 
Percentage of people who were linguistically 
isolated 
-3.331 
(1.708) 
-2.933*** 
(0.827) 
-2.969 
(1.689) 
-2.654*** 
(0.830) 
Percentage of owner-occupier households  
0.122 
(0.491) 
-0.014 
(0.246) 
0.433 
(0.489) 
0.214 
(0.249) 
Overall R2 0.777 0.837 0.7823 0.838 
).(./).(. βα jtjt xdszds ′′  n.a. 2.367 0.653 2.810 
).(./).(. jtjt vdszds α′  n.a. 0.815 0.302 0.832 
*** p < 0.01; ** p < 0.05; robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. 
Notes:  
1. Dependent variable: 





−− ∑
=
t
k
jkjjt rMr
1
0log)log(  
2. All specifications included state and year dummy variables. 
Table 3 – continued 
 (v) (vi) (vii) (viii) (ix) 
Frequency of visiting immediate neighbors 
 
 
   
-0.010 
(0.012) 
Frequency of visiting relatives 
 
 
   
-0.003** 
(0.001) 
Frequency of having friends visiting 
 
 
   
0.003** 
(0.001) 
Frequency of socializing with co-workers 
outside work 
 
 
   
-0.001 
(0.001) 
Freq. of visiting immediate neighbors × 
lagged cumulative registration rate 
    
0.179 
(0.095) 
Freq. of visiting relatives ×  
lagged cumulative registration rate 
    
0.023*** 
(0.008) 
Freq. of having friends visiting ×  
lagged cumulative registration rate 
    
-0.019** 
(0.009) 
Freq. of socializing with co-workers ×  
lagged cumulative registration rate 
    
0.005 
(0.009) 
Weekly newspaper circulation  
0.798*** 
(0.214) 
  
0.462*** 
(0.106) 
0.452*** 
(0.104) 
Lagged newspaper reports of DNC, 
weighted by circulation  
0.021*** 
(0.005) 
  
0.022*** 
(0.005) 
0.020*** 
(0.005) 
Lagged newspaper reports of number of 
DNC registrations, weighted by circulation  
-0.041** 
(0.017) 
  
-0.032 
(0.020) 
-0.030 
(0.020) 
Telemarketing sales intensity ×  
lagged cumulative registration rate 
 
2.935*** 
(0.144) 
 
3.153*** 
(0.143) 
2.579*** 
(0.327) 
Economic heterogeneity   
0.003 
(0.052) 
-0.056 
(0.029) 
-0.056 
(0.029) 
Social heterogeneity   
0.024 
(0.039) 
0.022 
(0.024) 
0.027 
(0.024) 
Economic heterogeneity ×  
lagged cumulative registration rate 
  
0.138 
(0.135) 
0.651*** 
(0.155) 
0.686*** 
(0.159) 
Social heterogeneity ×  
lagged cumulative registration rate 
  
-1.023*** 
(0.138) 
-1.101*** 
(0.155) 
-1.096*** 
(0.155) 
Average number of people in a household 
-0.440** 
(0.212) 
-0.294*** 
(0.102) 
-0.312 
(0.218) 
-0.160 
(0.101) 
-0.144 
(0.099) 
Median household income 
0.006 
(0.006) 
0.007** 
(0.003) 
0.012** 
(0.006) 
0.004 
(0.003) 
0.004 
(0.003) 
Percentage of people who were 
economically active 
0.260 
(1.902) 
-0.131 
(0.907) 
-0.624 
(1.958) 
-0.707 
(0.893) 
-0.726 
(0.881) 
Percentage of people above 16 years old 
who were employed 
-1.667 
(3.165) 
-0.569 
(1.535) 
-1.238 
(3.247) 
-0.409 
(1.526) 
-0.563 
(1.528) 
Percentage of people below 65 years old 
0.753 
(1.367) 
0.130 
(0.643) 
-0.274 
(1.368) 
0.279 
(0.635) 
0.210 
(0.617) 
Percentage of households led by female 
0.122 
(0.981) 
0.135 
(0.483) 
0.819 
(1.179) 
0.618 
(0.556) 
0.502 
(0.542) 
Percentage of people above 25 years old 
who received at least high school education 
0.553 
(0.767) 
0.165 
(0.356) 
0.700 
(0.770) 
0.138 
(0.345) 
0.086 
(0.340) 
Percentage of people who were 
linguistically isolated 
-2.988 
(1.691) 
-2.804*** 
(0.801) 
-3.365 
(1.728) 
-2.369*** 
(0.816) 
-2.352*** 
(0.790) 
Percentage of owner-occupier households  
0.436 
(0.490) 
-0.007 
(0.237) 
0.186 
(0.524) 
0.222 
(0.246) 
0.213 
(0.241) 
Overall R2 0.782 0.842 0.777 0.849 0.852 
).(./).(. βα jtjt xdszds ′′  0.671 2.896 0.435 4.109 4.465 
).(./).(. jtjt vdszds α′  0.309 0.954 0.249 1.054 1.085 
*** p < 0.01; ** p < 0.05; robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. 
Notes:  
1. Dependent variable: 





−− ∑
=
t
k
jkjjt rMr
1
0log)log(  
2. All specifications included state and year dummy variables. 
Table 4. Factor loadings  
Variable Factor 1 Factor 2 
Income heterogeneity 0.699  
Race heterogeneity 0.847  
Education heterogeneity 0.864  
Religion heterogeneity  0.580 
Age heterogeneity  0.810 
Note: Only loadings with absolute value > 0.4 are reported. 
 
 
 
Table 5. Relative contributions in utility — specification (ix) 
Factors ).(./).(. βα jtjt xdszds ′′  ).(./).(. jtjt vdszds α′  
Social interaction 1.005 0.244 
Newspaper reports 0.741 0.180 
Observational learning 0.183 0.044 
Telemarketing diversion 3.469 0.843 
Impact of heterogeneity 1.035 0.251 
 
 
 
Table 6. Relative need for privacy 
Comparisons Comparative 
variance 
Social factors (including social interaction, information saliency, 
and observational learning) relative to intrinsic need for privacy 
0.258 
Changes in privacy value due to telemarketing diversion relative to 
intrinsic need for privacy 
0.901 
Changes in privacy value due to telemarketing diversion (including 
the effects of heterogeneity) relative to intrinsic need for privacy 
0.891 
 Note: the intrinsic need was measured by 
jtx , uj, and vjt. 
 
Table 7. Robustness 
 (a) (b) (c) (d) (e) 
Frequency of visiting immediate neighbors 
-0.015 
(0.012) 
 
-0.010 
(0.012) 
-0.015 
(0.012) 
-0.001 
(0.014) 
Frequency of visiting relatives 
-0.003** 
(0.001) 
 
-0.003** 
(0.001) 
-0.004*** 
(0.001) 
-0.003** 
(0.001) 
Frequency of having friends visiting 
0.003** 
(0.001) 
 
0.002** 
(0.001) 
0.002 
(0.001) 
0.003** 
(0.001) 
Frequency of socializing with co-workers 
outside work 
-0.001 
(0.001) 
 
-0.001 
(0.001) 
0.001 
(0.001) 
-0.001 
(0.001) 
Formal social interaction  
-0.015 
(0.020) 
   
Informal social interaction  
0.054 
(0.034) 
   
Freq. of visiting immediate neighbors × 
lagged cumulative registration rate 
0.210** 
(0.097) 
 
0.183 
(0.096) 
0.098 
(0.095) 
0.084 
(0.114) 
Freq. of visiting relatives ×  
lagged cumulative registration rate 
0.023*** 
(0.008) 
 
0.022*** 
(0.008) 
0.039*** 
(0.009) 
0.017** 
(0.009) 
Freq. of having friends visiting ×  
lagged cumulative registration rate 
-0.019** 
(0.009) 
 
-0.018** 
(0.009) 
-0.017** 
(0.009) 
-0.022** 
(0.009) 
Freq. of socializing with co-workers ×  
lagged cumulative registration rate 
0.005 
(0.009) 
 
0.005 
(0.009) 
-0.002 
(0.009) 
0.007 
(0.009) 
Formal social interaction ×  
lagged cumulative registration rate 
 
0.278 
(0.152) 
   
Informal social interaction ×  
lagged cumulative registration rate 
 
-0.516 
(0.288) 
   
Weekly newspaper circulation  
0.420*** 
(0.107) 
0.447*** 
(0.107) 
0.451*** 
(0.104) 
0.154 
(0.084) 
0.539*** 
(0.131) 
Lagged newspaper reports of DNC, 
weighted by circulation  
 
0.023*** 
(0.005) 
 
0.020*** 
(0.005) 
0.010 
(0.007) 
Lagged newspaper reports of number of 
DNC registrations, weighted by circulation  
 
-0.033 
(0.020) 
 
-0.025 
(0.022) 
-0.020 
(0.016) 
Newspaper reports of DNC, weighted by 
circulation  
  
0.027*** 
(0.005) 
  
Newspaper reports of number of DNC 
registrations, weighted by circulation  
  
-0.053*** 
(0.018) 
  
Lagged newspaper reports of DNC, 
weighted by circulation (Factiva) 
0.090** 
(0.045) 
    
Lagged newspaper reports of number of 
DNC registrations, weighted by circulation 
(Factiva) 
-0.192 
(0.101) 
    
Telemarketing sales intensity ×  
lagged cumulative registration rate 
2.471*** 
(0.332) 
3.223*** 
(0.142) 
2.588*** 
(0.328) 
3.457*** 
(0.323) 
2.341*** 
(0.374) 
Economic heterogeneity 
-0.056 
(0.030) 
-0.059** 
(0.029) 
-0.057** 
(0.029) 
-0.047 
(0.027) 
-0.013 
(0.034) 
Social heterogeneity 
0.039 
(0.024) 
0.022 
(0.024) 
0.025 
(0.024) 
0.069*** 
(0.024) 
0.025 
(0.026) 
Economic heterogeneity ×  
lagged cumulative registration rate 
0.668*** 
(0.163) 
0.653*** 
(0.159) 
0.698*** 
(0.160) 
0.920*** 
(0.171) 
0.277 
(0.178) 
Social heterogeneity ×  
lagged cumulative registration rate 
-1.147*** 
(0.155) 
-1.116*** 
(0.155) 
-1.077*** 
(0.155) 
-0.910*** 
(0.169) 
-1.159*** 
(0.178) 
Average number of people in a household -0.144 -0.149 -0.142 0.004 -0.177 
(0.101) (0.101) (0.099) (0.092) (0.129) 
Median household income 
0.004 
(0.003) 
0.005 
(0.003) 
0.004 
(0.003) 
0.000 
(0.002) 
0.005 
(0.003) 
Percentage of people who were 
economically active 
-1.090 
(0.902) 
-0.650 
(0.881) 
-0.744 
(0.884) 
0.343 
(0.771) 
-0.523 
(1.090) 
Percentage of people above 16 years old 
who were employed 
-0.300 
(1.553) 
-0.414 
(1.513) 
-0.565 
(1.522) 
-0.764 
(1.248) 
-0.441 
(1.814) 
Percentage of people below 65 years old 
0.056 
(0.631) 
0.120 
(0.631) 
0.204 
(0.617) 
-0.578 
(0.484) 
0.195 
(0.774) 
Percentage of households led by female 
0.665 
(0.550) 
0.656 
(0.552) 
0.513 
(0.541) 
-0.755 
(0.446) 
0.549 
(0.695) 
Percentage of people above 25 years old 
who received at least high school education 
0.037 
(0.342) 
0.103 
(0.343) 
0.084 
(0.339) 
0.082 
(0.284) 
0.213 
(0.414) 
Percentage of people who were 
linguistically isolated 
-2.409*** 
(0.801) 
-2.511*** 
(0.813) 
-2.352*** 
(0.788) 
-2.195*** 
(0.637) 
-2.666*** 
(0.999) 
Percentage of owner-occupier households  
0.249 
(0.249) 
0.177 
(0.244) 
0.212 
(0.240) 
0.134 
(0.230) 
0.175 
(0.302) 
Overall R2 0.852 0.850 0.852 0.881 0.843 
).(./).(. βα jtjt xdszds ′′  4.159 4.107 4.451 6.109 3.062 
).(./).(. jtjt vdszds α′  1.074 1.073 1.083 1.341 0.984 
*** p < 0.01; ** p < 0.05; robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. 
Notes:  
1. Dependent variable: 





−− ∑
=
t
k
jkjjt rMr
1
0log)log(  
2. All specifications included state and year dummy variables. 
3. For specification (d), sample size = 2,790. 
4. An AR(1) error structure was specified for specification (e). 
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Appendix.  Data and Variable Construction  
 
Weekly “do not call” registrations 
We obtained records of registrations with the federal “do not call” registry from the FTC 
for the period between June 27, 2003 and January 6, 2006.  These records showed 
registrations by redacted telephone number for each area code and exchange, e.g., (617) 
363-xxxx, by date of registration.  For each area code and exchange, we aggregated the 
FTC daily-level data to the weekly level to obtain the number of “do not call” 
registrations for each calendar week, defined as Sunday to Saturday.
1
  
To proceed, we needed to match the registrations with data on demographics, 
social interaction, and observational learning which were available at the county level.   
We procured the North American Local Exchange NPA-NXX Database (NALENND) 
from Quentin Sager Consulting
2
.  Using the NALENND database, we identified the 
counties served by each telephone exchange.  
Some telephone exchanges spanned multiple counties. For these exchanges, we 
used the NALENND database to allocate the “do not call” registrations within an 
exchange to the respective counties according to the relative number of households in the 
counties as reported by Census 2000.  Additionally, we tried two other methods of 
allocating the exchange-level registrations to the respective counties: number of housing 
units and the population in each county.  Across these three methods of allocation, our 
findings from the empirical analyses were remarkably similar. 
Based on information from the NALENND database, we also removed “do not 
call” registrations originating from area codes and exchanges associated with mobile 
phones, pagers, and federal, state and local government.  
 
Market potential of registrations 
There are no published measures or statistics associated with the county-level initial 
market potential (Mj0) for “do not call” registrations.  As such, we had to rely on related 
                                                 
1
 Since “do not call” registrations started on June 27, 2003 which was a Friday, registrations for 
the first week in our data set comprised registrations from just two days -- June 27 and 28. 
2
 http://www.quentinsagerconsulting.com/npanxx_phonecodes.htm  [Accessed April 8, 2008] 
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measures published by the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) in order impute 
a reasonably accurate measure of the initial market potential.  
Specifically, we used data on the percentages of phone numbers in use by area 
code (Stroup and Vu (2003), Table 6)
3
 and the percentages of phone numbers associated 
with residential, rather than non-residential, subscribers by state (FCC (2003), Table 11)
4
.   
On the assumption that these percentages were uniform across all exchanges within area 
codes and states respectively, we then computed the initial market potential for each area 
code exchange-county as (10,000 lines  relative number of households in the county5  
percentage of numbers in use  percentage of residential numbers).  The county-level 
initial market potential, Mj0, was then derived by aggregating across all exchanges within 
a county. 
 
Weekly newspaper circulation 
We computed the county-level weekly circulation of newspaper titles in the fall of 2003 
based on circulation as reported by the Audit Bureau of Circulation (ABC).  For each 
newspaper title, the ABC reported the “coverage”, in terms of the ratio of circulation to 
the number of households, for possibly four days of the week – Monday, Friday, 
Saturday, and Sunday – by county.   
Then, for each newspaper, according to its respective publication cycle, we 
computed the weekly circulation, by county, as follows:  
Monday 5, if only Monday circulation reported
Monday 4  Friday, if only Monday and Friday circulation reported
Weekly circulation
Monday 4  Friday  Saturday, if Sunday circulation not reported
Monday
×
× +
=
× + +
×4  Friday  Saturday  Sunday, if all days' circulation reported





 + + +
 We summed the weekly circulation across all newspapers with circulation in a 
county to derive the weekly circulations of all newspapers for that county. 
                                                 
3
 http://www.fcc.gov/Bureaus/Common_Carrier/Reports/FCC-
State_Link/IAD/utilizationjun2003.pdf  [Accessed April 8, 2008] 
4
 http://www.fcc.gov/Bureaus/Common_Carrier/Reports/FCC-State_Link/IAD/lcom1203.pdf  
[Accessed April 8, 2008] 
5
 Recall that some exchanges span multiple counties.  Thus, we had to apportion the maximum 
number of 10,000 phone lines within an exchange across the various counties, according to the 
relative number of households in the county. 
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Newspaper reports of “do not call” registry and registration 
We compiled newspaper reports of the “do not call” registry from three proprietary news 
archives – Factiva, Google News, and Highbeam Research.  The combination of these 
three resources covered over 1200 online news sources.  However, among these 1200 
news sources, only 170 from Google News and 73 from Factiva were audited by the ABC. 
Our primary news data set was compiled from Google News and Highbeam 
Research.  The data retrieval process began from a search on “do not call”, following 
which a web crawler parsed the webpage search results into XML data formats. The 
objective of this retrieval step was to gather as many relevant documents as possible.  It 
retrieved around 400,000 reports.  Next, these reports were progressively filtered by 
successively adding constraint words such as “do not call” with “subscribers”, and “do 
not call” with “millions”.  The filtering process narrowed the set of news reports to 
approximately 20,000. 
 For each of the news sources, we then counted the number of newspaper reports 
in each calendar week covering news of the “do not call” registry and the number of 
telephone lines registered with the registry. We then retained only observations of news 
sources which were audited by ABC.  For these ABC-audited news sources, we then 
aggregated the weekly counts of newspaper reports to the county level by summing the 
counts across all newspapers distributed in a county.  
In order to derive a county-specific news exposure measure similar to the gross 
ratings point measure used in marketing research, we then multiplied the weekly counts 
of “do not call” registry reports for each newspaper with the corresponding weekly 
circulation of the newspaper in the county. 
We followed similar steps using Factiva.  As Factiva covered fewer ABC-audited 
newspapers, the numbers of news reports were lower than those based on Google News 
and Highbeam Research. 
 
 
